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Abstract. The increasing demand for efficient content distribution using the In-
ternet has fuelled the deployment of varied techniques such as peer-to-peer over-
lays, content distribution networks and distributed caching systems. These have
had considerable impact on ISP infrastructure demand, motivating the develop-
ment of protocols that enable mutually beneficial cooperative outcomes.
In this paper we propose a parameterised cooperation utility that can be used to
study the tradeoff between the benefit that an overlay obtains from the ISPs that
carry its traffic and the costs that it imposes on them. With this utility, we find a
closed-form expression for the optimal resource allocation given a particular co-
operation tradeoff, subject to both minimal benefit and maximal cost constraints.
Since the model is implementation-independent and has very modest computa-
tional demands, it is ideal for large scale simulation. We explore the properties
of the proposed model through simulation in both a simple illustrative scenario
and a more complete one based on network datasets. The results obtained from
the model are shown to be consistent with those of measurement-based studies of
overlay-ISP collaboration.
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1 Introduction
User demand for content distributed over the Internet has increased enormously in the
last decade. As a result, diverse solutions based on network overlays have been deployed
to make content distribution faster and more scalable. These include peer-to-peer sys-
tems, content distribution networks and distributed caching infrastructures, and we shall
group them under the name of content distribution overlays (CDOs). In this paper we
present a model that can be used to describe a range of cooperative behaviours between
CDOs and their underlying ISPs, taking into account the preferences of both.
If one considers the traffic allocation of greatest benefit to a given CDO, it is clear
that it will depend on its preferences regarding cost, QoS, resource availability, repli-
cation and data caching. On the other hand, if one considers the traffic allocation of
greatest benefit to an ISP, it will depend on its infrastructure and transmission costs,
the background traffic that it carries and its traffic engineering policies. Due to these
differences, tensions may arise between the preferences of the overlay and those of the
the ISP [15]. On the other hand, the existence of mutually beneficial outcomes arising
from Overlay-ISP cooperation has been extensively documented [2–5, 7, 8, 10, 16–19].
This has sparked interest not only within the research community, but also within stan-
dardisation working groups [14]. Usually, these works investigate particular tradeoffs
between overlay optimality and ISP costs in the context of specific protocols or applica-
tions. However, a more general cost-benefit model for these tradeoffs, developed from
basic assumptions describing the preferences of both ISPs and CDOs, can be a useful
tool in the understanding of the common foundations that they share.
The main contributions of this paper are a parameterised cooperation utility that can
be used to describe the cost-benefit tradeoffs of ISP-aware content distribution overlays,
and a closed-form solution for the optimal tradeoff that arises from it. Our model starts
from a set of basic assumptions regarding both the benefits that overlays can obtain and
the costs that they impose on the ISPs that carry their traffic, as provided by [1, 14, 19],
and goes on to provide benefit and cost functions that satisfy them. A utility function is
then presented that can be used to describe the tradeoff between CDO benefit and ISP
cost. This utility then becomes the objective in a constrained maximisation problem,
which is solved to provide a closed form solution for the CDO traffic allocation that
embodies the optimal tradeoff. This analytic solution greatly reduces the computational
effort involved in performing simulations using our model, allowing it to scale easily
to overlays with several million links using modest computational resources. Finally,
our evaluation shows that the results produced by this model are consistent with the
conclusions of measurement-based studies of overlay-ISP collaboration.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the general characteristics of our
first-principles model in §2, followed by the model itself in §3. We present a simulation-
based evaluation in §4, other contributions in this area in §5, and conclude in §6.
2 A Model for Overlay-ISP Cooperation
We commence by defining the central components of our model, as shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. The Overlay-ISP Boundary between a CDO and its underlying ISPs.
– Content Distribution Overlays (CDO) are overlay networks formed by a set of
nodes placed across the Internet and providing content retrieval services to end
users. Examples would be peer-to-peer networks, managed overlay networks for
the distribution of multimedia streams or content delivery networks (CDNs).
– Internet Service Providers (ISP) are business organisations that provide connec-
tivity services to end customers and CDOs.
2.1 The Cooperation Utility
We model the tradeoffs in Overlay-ISP cooperation by proposing a utility function that
balances the benefit that the overlay derives from the services provided by its underlying
ISPs and the costs that it imposes on them. For a given set of CDO and ISP preferences,
this utility function can be used to assess the performance of different CDO traffic
allocation policies when compared with the optimum. We assume that ISPs reveal their
costs only to their local peers, and that they do so using interfaces such as [1, 14, 19].
Since no similar interface exists for overlay-to-overlay communication, we assume that
each overlay operates independently and therefore focus on the single-overlay case. We
will formulate the Overlay-ISP tradeoff problem so that each peer can solve a local
optimisation problem individually, obviating the need for central control.
We denote the set of all ISPs as I, and the set of all CDO nodes as N . For each
node in the CDO we consider a utility function Ui that combines the benefits that it
can obtain given a particular traffic allocation with the costs that such an allocation
will impose on its underlying ISPs. We then maximise this utility, taking as input the
relevant flow costs and qualities. This will yield the optimal CDO traffic allocation in
terms of a set of bandwidth assignments to traffic flows. We define a traffic flow as a
3-tuple (s, i, j) consisting of an ISP s, a local node i and a remote node j. Conceptually,
a flow is a representation for the overlay traffic between a local peer i in ISP s and a
remote peer j. Our model admits multi-homed nodes; i can be local to a set of ISPs
denoted as Li (of course, Li ⊂ I ∀ i). Each flow will be annotated with a flow volume
bsij which represents the total amount of traffic that the flow carries, a flow cost per
unit bandwidth csij provided by s, and a flow quality qsij estimated or measured by the
overlay. We propose that each one of the nodes of the overlay will have a utility
Ui = αiBi − iCi, (1)
in which the benefit and cost terms are
Bi =
 ∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bβisijq
γi
sij
δi and Ci =
 ∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bζisijc
ηi
sij
θi , (2)
and where αi, βi, γi, δi, i, ζi, ηi and θi are cost-benefit node parameters that can be
tuned to capture the preferences of both the CDO and its underlying ISPs. The first
term in (1) models the benefit that node i obtains from its overlay traffic with all other
nodes; the second term, the aggregate preference cost (i.e. in the sense of [1, 14, 19])
that its ISP set Li is exposed to by carrying this traffic. Rather than modelling intricate
protocol specifications or detailed ISP business models, we aim to find a simple, general
model based on basic assumptions. For Bi, this led us to select the functional form in
(2) because it captures several intuitions about CDO preferences.
– Increasing benefit with increasing flow volume (αi > 0, 0 < βi < 1, 0 < δi < 1).
In a capacity constrained scenario, the best nodes would only be able to provide
service to a subset of end users, forcing the rest to rely on less desirable nodes and
leading to reduced CDO benefit. Since increased flow volume ameliorates this, it
results in an increased benefit for the overlay.
– Increasing benefit with increasing quality (0 < γi < 1). We assume that overlay
links will be annotated with a quality qsij , so that transferring the same amount of
traffic between two nodes yields greater benefit if the quality of the overlay link
between them increases.
– Diminishing marginal benefit on increasing flow volume (0 < βi < 1). This models
the fact that not all data available in a given node is equally useful. Thus, any
given node will experience decreasing marginal benefit from increasing amounts of
received traffic from another given node.
– Non-increasing marginal benefit on increasing flow quality (0 ≤ γi ≤ 1). In many
cases, such as voice or video streaming, once the quality of the received stream is
high enough to decode the stream in time, no further improvement will be achieved
by increasing the quality of overlay flows. Thus, benefit increases with quality, but
only with diminishing returns.
– Non-increasing marginal benefit on the number of incoming flows (0 ≤ δi ≤ 1). We
assume that different nodes might have access to different kinds of content of inter-
est to a particular node, so that benefit increases with the number of sender nodes
that a given node has. However, it is improbable that all nodes will yield equivalent
usefulness to the receiving node. Consequently, the benefit from connecting to an
increasing numbers of nodes will increase at a decreasing rate.
Even though the csij provided by [1, 14, 19] may not represent direct ISP costs, they
can be used as proxies for cost-related ISP preferences. We define the preference cost
function Ci in (2) so that it captures the following intuitions.
– Increasing cost with increasing flow volume (i > 0, 0 < ζi < 1, 0 < δi < 1). We
assume that, for a fixed cost-per-bit, the delivery of increasing amounts of traffic
between overlay nodes imposes an increasing cost on ISPs.
– Increasing cost with increasing infrastructure cost (0 < θi < 1). We assume that
transferring the same amount of traffic between two nodes imposes greater costs if
the cost of the underlying network infrastructure is higher.
– Non-increasing marginal flow volume cost (0 ≤ ζi ≤ 1). This models the fact that
Internet connectivity to a particular host imposes fixed costs, usually related to the
provision of physical layer infrastructure. Thus, cost increases disproportionally for
the first units of provisioned capacity.
– Non-increasing marginal infrastructure cost (0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1). This models economies
of scale in traffic aggregation, which can lead to reduced cost per bit.
– Non-increasing marginal cost for increasing number of nodes communicating with
an overlay node (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). This allows the modelling of economies of scale in
colocation and port density. Once a node has been provided with resources, provid-
ing resources to other nearby nodes can be done at a reduced cost per node.
3 The Overlay-ISP Cooperation Problem
In our model, the Overlay-ISP Cooperation Problem is solved by maximising the CDO
cooperation utility taking the preferences of the CDO and ISPs as given by the cost-
benefit tradeoff parameters αi, βi, γi, δi, i, ζi, ηi and θi ∀ i ∈ N . We formulate the
Overlay-ISP cooperation problem as
Maximise:
bsij∈R≥0
U =
∑
i∈N
Ui =
∑
i∈N
αiBi −
∑
i∈N
iCi. (3)
First, we will assume that the CDO has no requirements regarding either the bene-
fits that it obtains or the costs it imposes on its underlying ISPs. Thus, we concentrate
our attention on finding the optimal bsij for given qsij , csij , and additional model pa-
rameters. Since only non-restricted optimisation is required, we can apply first order
conditions to (3) directly. This leads to the following system of equations
∂U
∂bsij
=
∑
i∈N
αi
∂Bi
∂bsij
−
∑
i∈N
i
∂Ci
∂bsij
= 0, (4)
where Bi and Ci are given by (2). For clarity reasons, for now we will disregard con-
gestion and economy of scale effects, thus making qsij and csij constant (we will later
re-introduce the notion of costs and qualities as functions of bsij). This makes (4) sep-
arable, and the first order conditions become
αi
∂Bi
∂bsij
− i ∂Ci
∂bsij
= 0, (5)
where the marginal benefit and cost terms are
∂Bi
∂bsij
= δi
βib
βi−1
sij q
γi
sij(∑
j∈N ,s∈Li b
βi
sijq
γi
sij
)1−δi and ∂Ci∂bsij = θi ζib
ζi−1
sij c
ηi
sij(∑
j∈N ,s∈Li b
ζi
sijc
ηi
sij
)1−θi ,
(6)
for each overlay node i. It is clear that the denominators in (6) do not depend on j, the
remote endpoint of the flow, nor on its ingress ISP s. Rather, they are only a function
of bsij , the desired traffic allocation, and the other properties of the local node i. By
considering ∂Bibtik and
∂Ci
btik
, the marginal benefit and cost associated with another arbi-
trary flow (t, i, k) having the same local node i, but with a different ingress ISP t and
terminating on a different remote node k, it can be shown that(
bsij
btik
)ζi−βi
=
qγisij
cηisij
cηitik
qγitik
. (7)
This means that, discounted by a diminishing returns exponent ζi−βi, the ratio between
the bandwidth allocated to two flows (s, i, j) and (t, i, k) terminating in the same local
node i will be equal to the ratio between their cost-benefits, defined as the ratios be-
tween their qualities and their costs. In particular, if we define the preference-modified
cost-benefit µsij as µsij =
(
q
γi
sij
c
ηi
sij
) 1
ζi−βi
, we see that (7) can be rewritten so that
bsij
btik
=
µsij
µtik
. Thus, we see that the solution to (3) will provide overlay traffic allocations
bsij proportional to the µsij associated with (s, i, j). Using the previous definitions, the
first order conditions can be solved in the standard manner from (5). This solution is
cumbersome but straightforward, and is omitted for brevity. For the unconstrained case,
we find that bsij , the optimal bandwidth allocation for a flow between nodes j and i
using ISP s as an ingress, can be expressed as
bsij =
(
αi
i
ψi
)ξi
µsij (8)
where
ψi =
βiδi
ζiθi
(∑
j∈N ,s∈Li µ
ζi
sijc
ηi
sij
)1−θi
(∑
j∈N ,s∈Li µ
βi
sijq
γi
sij
)1−δi , ξi = 1ζiθi − βiδi .
The set of flow volumes defined by (8) represent an optimal tradeoff between the CDO
qualities qsij and the costs csij announced by ISPs, given their respective preferences.
We now address the case where the CDO has operational constraints. To this end,
we propose an improved model which, as we shall see, is a simple extension of that of
the previous section. This new optimisation problem can be stated as
Maximise:
bsij∈R≥0
U =
∑
i∈N
Ui (9)
Subject to:
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bβisijq
γi
sij
δi = ∑
i∈N
Bi ≥ Bmin (10)
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bζisijc
ηi
sij
θi = ∑
i∈N
Ci ≤ Cmax (11)
where (10) is the minimum benefit tolerable to the overlay, and (11) is the maximum
aggregate cost that the overlay is willing to impose on all the ISPs that provide it with
connectivity services. The solution to this problem is a simple extension to (3), with a
slightly expanded Lagrangean that leads to the first order optimality conditions
(αi + λB)
∂Bi
∂bsij
− (i + λC) ∂Ci
∂bsij
= 0, (12)
along with the two complementary slackness conditions
λB
(
Bmin −
∑
i∈N
Bi
)
= 0, λC
(∑
i∈N
Ci − Cmax
)
= 0.
In the previous expressions, λB corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier associated with
overlay benefit and λC corresponds to that associated with ISP costs.
We seek an expression for b∗sij , the solution to the budget-constrained problem. The
derivation proceeds as in the previous case, and we have that
b∗sij =
(
αi + λB
i + λC
ψi
)ξi
µsij =
(
1 + λBαi
1 + λCi
)ξi
bsij , (13)
where bsij is given by (8) and represents the flow volume that would have been allocated
to a flow from node j to node i entering the network through ISP s, had no constraints
been active. As expected, if no constraint binds, λC = λB = 0 and (13) reduces to (8).
The unconstrained problem (3) can be implemented in a decentralised fashion triv-
ially because U is the sum of the individual utilities Ui of each node. The constrained
problem (9) is only slightly more difficult to distribute, as it is only coupled by the
two constraints (10) and (11). For the simulations in §4, we find λB , λC and b∗sij us-
ing standard dual decomposition techniques [6]. Thanks to (13), and by allocating an
independent thread to each node in the optimisation solver, it is possible to take full
advantage from multicore architectures and significantly reduce simulation time.
We now include congestion and economies of scale considerations in our model.
Having solved (9) for constant qsij and csij , we now expand our scope to consider q˜sij
and c˜sij , equivalent expressions that are functions of bsij . However, to keep the model
as simple as possible and compatible with the solutions that we have already found,
we will make two assumptions. The first one is that q˜sij and c˜sij are functions with
constant elasticity, i.e. Eqi=
∂ log q˜sij
∂ log bsij
=0, and Eci=
∂ log c˜sij
∂ log bsij
=0. The second one is that
their elasticitiesEqi andE
c
i are functions of i only, thus keeping the first order conditions
separable. Hence, we propose cost and quality functions of the form
q˜sij = qsijb
Eqi
sij , c˜sij = csijb
Eci
sij , (14)
where Eqi is the access congestion elasticity, E
c
i is the economy of scale elasticity,
and qsij and csij correspond to the constant quality and cost introduced in (2). The
naming of Eqi and E
c
i is indicative of their function in the model. In particular, |Eqi |
will represent the percent decrease in overlay link quality qsij with a percent increase
in bsij , and |Eci | will represent the percent decrease of per-unit-bandwidth cost csij
with a percent increase in bsij . Since quality will be reduced with increased traffic flow,
Eqi < 0, and since economy of scale effects reduce the cost per bit, E
c
i < 0 as well.
Therefore, Eqi determines how the link quality qsij falls off as the access link of the
local node i becomes congested; conversely, Eci determines how the link cost csij falls
off with economies of scale in the access link of the local node i.
The rationale behind choosing this model of access link congestion and economies
of scale is that it allows us to consider the effect of both q˜sij and c˜sij as an additive
constant. Consider the effect of replacing qsij and csij in (2) with q˜sij and c˜sij from
(14): it amounts to using modified β˜i and ζ˜i so that
β˜i = βi + γiE
q
i , ζ˜i = ζi + ηiE
c
i .
To see how substituting β˜i and ζ˜i into the previous expressions changes our model,
we note that, from (8), bsij will increase with increasing β˜i, and it will decrease with
increasing ζ˜i. As |Eqi | increases, β˜i will decrease and bsij will decrease as well; as |Eci |
increases, ζ˜i will decrease, and bsij will increase. Thus, a propensity for congestion in
the access link of i can be modelled with a large |Eqi |, and the overlay will react with a
general reduction in traffic with i as flow volume increases. Conversely, if |Eci | is large,
denoting good cost efficiency, the overlay will increase traffic to and from i.
In order for (8) to remain a valid solution of the optimisation problem, we must
impose limitations on some of the model parameters. We now explore these.
– Positive traffic attraction (β˜i > 0). When |Eqi | = βiγi , β˜i = 0, making bsij equal to
zero for all s and j. Conceptually, this means that the overlay has found the access
link of node i to be excessively congested, and thus removes it from consideration.
Further increases in the magnitude of Eqi are ignored; traffic will resume when E
q
i
decreases.
– Positive traffic avoidance (ζ˜i > 0). As |Eci |→ ζiηi , ζ˜i→0, and bsij→∞. This happens
when the cost reduction associated with increasing volume on flows towards i is so
large that the overlay attempts to continually increase their volume.
– Concave Utility (ζ˜i− β˜i > 0 and ζ˜iθi− β˜iδi > 0). These two conditions are related
with the existence of a well-defined maximum for Ui over an unrestricted domain.
In both cases, violation of these conditions implies that costs grow more slowly
than benefits, and it is thus the overlay will continually increase flows towards i.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate our model through simulation. In §4.1, we demonstrate its fundamentals
with a simple thought experiment; in §4.2, we perform a dataset-driven simulation.
4.1 Basic Simulation
In this section we explore the basic properties of our model by proposing an illustrative
thought experiment. We consider a CDO with presence in at least three different ISPs,
which we shall designate as A, B and D (see Fig. 1). We select three overlay nodes, a
client node d and two server nodes sA and sB , that connect to the overlay via ISPs D,
A, and B respectively. We will consider two overlay flows: (A, sA, d), the target flow
through which sA communicates with d via ISP A, and (B, sB , d), the competing flow
through which sB communicates with d via ISPB. We then modify the cost and quality
associated with the target flow, and observe the CDO response.
This simulation makes use of the model with operational constraints presented in
§3, with the following parameters: αi = 1, βi = .1, γi = .2, δi = .3, ζi = .7,
ηi = .8 and θi = .9 for all nodes i, and we calibrate U by setting i to a value such
that U = 0 if λB = λC = 0. Regarding the flow-related parameters, we will set
Eqi = −.2, Eci = −.1, qsij = 1 and csij = 1 for all flows (s, i, j) except the target
flow, for which we will vary both cost and quality uniformly over the range [1, 10].
The cost associated with the target flow will be denoted as qT , and its cost, as cT .
Constraints were set so that Bmin = 5.25 and Cmax =∞; these were chosen to ensure
(10) to be active within region of the cost-quality parameter space in which Ui < 0.
We emphasise that these parameter values do not correspond to any particular protocol
implementation. Rather, they were selected to be internally consistent, and to aid in the
presentation of the basic properties of our model. For the chosen parameter values, the
overlay tradeoff preferences favour good-quality connectivity with a large set of nodes,
rather than exceptionally high-quality connections with a reduced node set. Therefore,
the effect of Bi dominates at lower values of bsij , and that of Ci at higher ones. The
results are shown in Fig. 2, in which each pixel in each subfigure is a solution to (9).
Fig. 2(a) shows the optimal tradeoff overlay target flow volume between sA and d,
while Fig. 2(b) shows the competing flow volume allocation between sB and d. The
(a) Target flow volume (b) Competing flow volume (c) Total overlay benefit
Fig. 2. Simulating quality and cost changes for the CDO tradeoff model (all magnitudes shown
are in arbitrary units)
overlay can allocate volume to at least two flows terminating in d, and the costs of
these flows will be provided by two different ISPs (A and B). We can see that, for a
given target flow cost cT , as the target flow quality qT increases, the target flow volume
allocated by the optimisation algorithm increases as well. Conversely, for a given qT ,
as cT increases, the allocated target flow volume decreases. Thus, the model provides
sensitivity to the requirements of both the overlay and its underlying ISPs.
In Fig. 2(b), we can see that if qT decreases, the competing flow volume increases.
Near the top of the graph, the high quality of the target flow means that the Bmin re-
striction is inactive. Hence, the competing flow increases as ψi increases, as required
by (8). For the target flow, however, µsij decreases by a greater amount. This leads to a
net reduction in the target flow along with an increase in all other incoming flows to d,
including the competing flow. Thus, the model predicts that, when faced with changing
ISP-reported costs and varying connection qualities, overlays will respond by substi-
tuting volume over expensive, low quality overlay links with volume over links which
provide better cost-benefit. However, this effect is small when compared to the response
of the model to the minimum benefit restriction becoming active, which is the case near
the bottom of Fig. 2(b) and throughout the black region in the lower right of 2(c).
Since we did not introduce any explicit flow volume constraints in the model, we
see that the reduction in traffic induced by increasing the target flow is not balanced
by an equivalent increase of traffic over the competing flow. The model presented per-
forms traffic substitution proportionally to cost-benefit and with diminishing returns,
with traffic to all other destinations (many of which are not shown here). Therefore, the
availability of overlay links with high-quality and low-cost is always preferable to the
CDO, as they significantly increase its utility.
4.2 Dataset-driven Simulation
In this section we compare our model with simplified approximations of tradeoff tech-
niques previously investigated in measurement-based studies. Our objective will not be
to accurately describe the tradeoffs made by any single implementation. Instead, we
will focus on defining a set of controlled scenarios and exploring the conditions under
which previously proposed tradeoffs approach optimality as measured by (1).
The dataset we used was originally obtained for [12], and includes round-trip times
and computed AS paths between 1715 users participating in a file sharing application.
The round-trip times were obtained by taking samples every two days between all pairs
of nodes using the King [9] method. The AS paths were computed from three different
sources: RouteViews [20], Looking Glass servers and iPlane [13]. From this dataset, we
only kept those pairs of nodes for which latency measurements were consistent across
the different samples and a good estimation of the number of AS hops between them
was available. For those IP addresses in this subset, we obtained geolocation informa-
tion by querying the http://ipinfodb.com database, and used these geographical
coordinates to calculate the great circle (haversine) distance between them.
For all cases, we used network-measured round-trip time as a proxy for overlay
link quality. This choice is aligned with the performance objectives of real-time content
applications, where overlay links with low latency are more desirable. So, for all flows
(s, j, i), we have that qsij ∝ t−1R , where tR is the RTT between nodes j and i. Regarding
the per-unit-bandwidth cost csij associated with (s, i, j) and announced by ISP s, we
consider two alternatives.
– HAVERSINE: In this case, we use the great-circle distance between the geographical
coordinates associated with the IP addresses of the nodes as an approximation of
the ISP cost to provide connectivity between these endpoints. This choice reflects
the intuition that the end-to-end traffic delivery cost is higher the further away two
nodes are in physical space. In particular, we have that csij ∝ dh, where dh is the
haversine distance between the nodes.
– AS HOPS: In this case, we use the number of AS hops between two node IP ad-
dresses as an approximation of the cost incurred by the ISP to provide connectivity
between them. In particular, we have that csij ∝ h + 1, where h is the number
of AS hops between the node IP addresses. This measure is of particular interest
because many other Overlay-ISP collaboration works rely in AS-hop distances for
node clustering, either in simple intradomain vs. interdomain terms or using AS-
path lengths. Some examples of these include [3–5, 8, 17].
Regarding the cost/benefit tradeoff parameters αi and i, we set i = 1 and calibrate αi
so that the reception of 1 unit of bandwidth with a 10 millisecond delay from 4 nodes
at a standard level of ISP cost will provide a zero utility Ui. In the case of HAVERSINE,
we set this standard cost at 1000 miles; for AS HOPS, we set it at 3 hops. Finally, for the
other cost-benefit tradeoff preference parameters, we use the values presented in §4.1.
We consider two methods for the construction of our simulated overlay network.
– Full Set: In this case, we assume that the existence of delay measurements between
two nodes in the dataset implies the existence of a potential overlay link.When
using this method, the overlay network contains 1, 545 nodes and∼2 million links,
whose distribution is sharply bimodal:∼930 nodes have∼1, 530 overlay links, and
∼620 have ∼920 links.
– Synthetic Overlay: In this case, only a subset of the full delay measurement graph
is considered to construct the overlay topology. For each node in turn, m other
nodes for which measurements are available were randomly nominated as potential
neighbours. For the purpose of this evaluation, we consider m=5, which yields an
overlay with 1, 545 nodes and ∼15, 450 links. Each node has between 5 and 20
neighbours, with an average of 10.
In order to explore alternative allocation policies that result from other cost/benefit pro-
files, we consider the following.
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Fig. 3. Cumulative Distribution Functions of the Utility Ui for the HAVERSINE model.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative Distribution Functions of the Utility Ui for the AS HOPS model.
– Tradeoff : This is our proposed model, as obtained by solving (9). This solution is
used to obtain a per-node traffic volume bˆi =
∑
s,j bsij that is used as a constraint
in the other allocation policies.
– Uniform: This is a simple allocation policy in which each node allocates bˆi equally
among all its neighbours (this was typical of early peer-to-peer overlays, e.g. Gnutella).
– Max. Benefit: Each node individually maximises its own benefit while adhering to
a total traffic flow constraint. In particular, each node solves
Maximise: Bi, Subject to:
∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bsij = bˆi.
The solution of this problem is standard, and is given by
bsij =
τsij∑
j∈N ,s∈Li τsij
bˆi, τsij = q
γi
1−βi
sij .
This resource allocation policy approximates the operation of current content de-
livery networks (CDNs), which operate without explicit consideration of ISP costs.
– Min. Cost: Each node individually minimises the cost it imposes to all ISPs, while
adhering to a total traffic flow constraint. In particular, each node solves
Minimise: Ci, Subject to:
∑
j∈N ,s∈Li
bsij = bˆi.
The solution of this problem is standard, and is given by an allocation where bsij =
bˆi for the flow (s, i, j) for which c
ηiθi
sij is minimal, and bsij = 0 for all other flows.
– n-Best: Each node chooses the n neighbours for which qβiδisij is maximal, and allo-
cates bˆi equally between them. This policy is reminiscent not only of the unchoking
behaviour in BitTorrent seeding, but also of [5]. In this case, we chose n = 4.
– n-Cheapest: Each node chooses the n neighbours for which cηiθisij is minimal, and
allocates bˆi equally between them. Again, we set n = 4. This policy is suggestive
of a situation in which the ISP provides cost-optimised information to the CDO,
which then uses it with no regard to its own benefit.
– c−1-Proportional: Each node allocates to each neighbour a traffic flow inversely
proportional to the ISP cost associated with the overlay link between them. Thus,
bsij =
c−1sij∑
j∈N ,s∈Li c
−1
sij
bˆi.
– q-Proportional: In this case, each node allocates to each neighbour a traffic flow
proportional to the overlay link quality between them. Thus, we have that
bsij =
qsij∑
j∈N ,s∈Li qsij
bˆi.
This heuristic is reminiscent of the proportional share policy presented in [11].
The results of our simulations can be found in Figs. 3 and 4. For the HAVERSINE
parameter mapping, we see that all policies tested fall into essentially four groups. If we
go from right to left following the top of Fig. 3(a), first we find tradeoff by itself, fol-
lowed by a group formed by max. benefit, uniform, c−1-prop and q-prop. We will denote
this group as Group II. The third group to the left includes n-best and n-cheapest, and
will be denoted as Group III; the final group consists of min. cost on its own. As shown
in Figs. 3(a), 3(b) and Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), these groups appear consistently across the
model mapping and overlay construction methods presented. What differentiates these
groups is that the policies in Group II can allocate traffic between all neighbour nodes
of a particular node, those in Group III have access to only n = 4 neighbours, and min.
cost uses a single one. Thus, for the parameter values chosen, securing an appropriate
number of neighbours (and related flows) is of importance to increase overlay benefit.
Overall, tradeoff provides improved utility in all cases. In both AS HOPS and HAVER-
SINE and for all groups, synthetic overlay topologies show more homogeneous utilities
that are generally lower than those in full set. This is to be expected from the increased
node selection opportunities afforded by full set. However, since observed tradeoffs are
otherwise consistent for these two, we will comment on both of them simultaneously.
Group II exhibits better performance in the AS HOPS scenarios, with HAVERSINE
full dataset in particular suffering from a long tail of nodes with negative utilities. This
makes these policies even worse than those of Group III for many nodes in this scenario.
Although all policies in this group generate very similar utility distributions in all cases,
the differences between them are slightly larger for both HAVERSINE scenarios. As
shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), the CDFs generated by policies in Group III are much
more consistent for the HAVERSINE scenarios, where the lines of n-best and n-cheapest
overlap, than for the AS HOPS scenarios of Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), in which n-best exhibits
slightly better utility distributions. In all cases, min. cost severely impacts the overlay
while minimising cost, leading to the worst Ui CDF. The good cost-benefit tradeoff
performance of Group II provides confirmation that, for some definitions of benefit and
cost, there is a convergence of incentives between overlays and ISPs as embodied by
the cooperation utility Ui. In particular, as shown by recent wide-scale measurement
studies [17], for biased random topologies such as locality-aware BitTorrent, the use of
AS-hops yields significant cost savings for ISPs with no reductions in overlay benefit.
5 Related Work
The expression of explicit interactions between overlays and ISPs is receiving increased
attention by the research community (see, for instance, [2–5, 7, 8, 10, 16–19]). These
studies present particular ways in which CDO construction optimality and ISP cost can
be balanced, thus providing specific examples along the spectrum of tradeoffs consid-
ered by our model. Some of these works are now described.
The main work in this area is P4P [19], which became the basis for the main stan-
dardisation effort in the area [14]. In its original presentation, [19] relied on the ISP
aggregating peers into groups (PIDs) and providing a set of end-to-end prices between
them. In that case, the overlay was assumed to solve a particular minimisation problem
arising from the dual decomposition of the ISP optimisation problem. The present work
provides an alternative, overlay-centred view which remains compatible with [14] while
being easily re-parameterisable to reflect diverse ISP and CDO preferences. Chronolog-
ically, one of the first works to focus in BitTorrent locality was [4], which relies on the
ISP tagging peers as either local or external. This allows the overlay to set a soft limit
on external peers, biasing peer selection and giving preference to intradomain connec-
tions. In [3], the authors present a system in which an oracle performs peer ranking
according to the preferences of the ISP. Although many possible metrics are presented
as candidates (AS path length, IGP metric distance, geographical information, expected
bandwidth/delay and link congestion) the authors focus in AS path length. In [2], this
system is extended to take into account peer upload bandwidth, and in [16] it is further
improved by enriching DNS responses with ISP-provided information.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a model for the behaviour of ISP-aware overlays that is based
only on basic assumptions regarding overlay and ISP preferences. This model is inde-
pendent from implementation-specific details and can be used to explore the universal
aspects of the cooperation between ISPS and overlays. To this end, we presented a co-
operation utility that captures some basic intuitions regarding the preferences of both
overlays and ISPs. This utility is then used to formulate an optimisation problem incor-
porating minimum benefit and maximum cost constraints, which is solved analytically.
It is shown that, if expressed in a specific functional form, congestion and economy
of scale effects can be considered in a straightforward way. Finally, simulations are
used to show the properties of the proposed model. First, a simple simulation is pre-
sented to show the way in which the model responds to a changing overlay link cost.
Then, a more comprehensive simulation based on network measurement datasets is pre-
sented. In addition to providing evidence that our model can be used to gain insight into
the complex interactions in Overlay-ISP cooperation, this data-driven simulation shows
that our model behaves consistently with previous findings regarding the cost-benefit
gains provided by some ISP-aware traffic allocation policies.
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